LAWYERS acting for around 200 people hit by the Buncefield disaster say they will be returning to the courts in light of the latest investigation progress report.

Des Collins, of Collins Solicitors, says the report gives them enough ammunition to get a fresh hearing on a group compensation claim.

A High Court hearing in March into various claims against Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited (HOSL), which runs the oil depot, was adjourned until October.

But in this week’s report investigators point to failings in the safety systems at the depot as factors in the disaster.
Mr Collins said: “Clearly we have to wait for the response from HOSL. If that is positive in terms of claimants’ concerns we can be in a position to move forward quickly.

“We think the latest developments are sufficiently important to go back to the court.”
Mr Collins said he would be making an application to the judge to reopen the hearing ‘as quickly as possible’.

One victim in the group action is Ford Shackcloth, whose home in Cherry Tree Lane was badly damaged in the explosion.

He said: “I think this report’s quite good because it keeps the pressure on the oil companies. “It puts it back in the public domain and begins to point the finger at the oil companies.”
Mr Shackcloth’s home, just 300m from the depot, had its front door blown in, ceilings collapsed and parts had to be completely rebuilt, including the conservatory.

THE CATASTROPHIC FAILURES in TANK 912

▪ First of all the fuel level gauge broke
▪ Then the overflow alarm failed to shut off petrol supplies
▪ To top that the tank design then helped create a lethal cloud
▪ 40 minutes later the country was rocked by the Buncefield Blast

The failure of two key safety mechanisms at the Buncefield oil depot led to the huge fuel spill that caused the disaster.

For 40 minutes before the blast 300 tones of petrol – enough to fill 8,500 cars – overflowed from Tank 912, leading to the formation of a massive cloud of fuel vapour.

Fuel was still being pumped into the tank at the time of the explosion because a level gauge failed and showed the tank two thirds full.

A final failsafe switch, designed to sound an alarm and shut off the fuel supply into the tank, also did not work.
Investigators believe the vapour cloud was then ignited by a spark in either, or both, a power generator at Northgate Information Solutions and a pump house on the oil storage site, part of the depot’s automatic fire-fighting system.

The failures have come to light in the third progress report of the Buncefield Investigation into Europe’s largest peacetime fire, in which 43 people were hurt.
The blaze was started by an explosion at just after 6am on December 11 and took four days to bring under control, leaving Hemel Hempstead under a huge smoke plume.

Investigation manager Taf Powell said: “The filling detection equipment recorded an unchanged reading – we know filling did continue.
“The tank would have been full by about 5.30am. From that time it would have begun to overflow.
“The fuel could easily have generated a large vapour cloud very rapidly.”

“Whether or not an alarm sounded, and we don’t know that one did, there was no shutdown of the system because filling did continue.”

The investigation board, chaired by Lord Tony Newton, refused to be drawn on whether it was technical or human error behind the disaster.
Lord Newton said aspects of the report ‘take us straight into questions of culpability and blame which can only be decided by the courts and not this board’.

Mr Powell referred to the inquiry as a ‘criminal investigation’ but said “We are focusing on physical processes and plain facts – we don’t address any shortcomings in the design and operation the site.”
The board’s report reveals the disaster started in Tank 912, which was taking delivery of unleaded fuel from the Lindsey oil refinery in Lincolnshire.
From 3am the tank’s level gauge gave an unchanged reading, but filling continued, and it has been calculated the tank would have been full at 5.20am.

Fuel spilled out of the air vents in the roof and cascaded down the sides of the tank.
The design of the tank, with a high lip around the roof and a band around the sides, meant the liquid splattered to the ground and mixed more easily with the air to form the vapour cloud.

The failsafe switch, which was relatively new, was supposed to sound an alarm in the control room, where two people were on duty that night, but investigators do not know whether this happened.
The switch also had an override function to prevent the system automatically shutting off the inlet valves into Tank 912 in the event of an alarm, but investigators refused to say whether or not this had been turned on.
Investigators have considered the possibility that the leak tripped an alarm, causing a spark in the fire pump house, which then ignited the vapour cloud.
“The pumps might have been activated and solenoid valves within them would have released quite a high energy spark which would have been capable of igniting vapour in that pump house,” Mr Powell said.
The next stage of the investigation will focus on why the failures occurred, including any underlying causes, and why the explosion was so violent.
A number of residents are still unable to return to their homes following the disaster while many jobs have been lost with companies moving out of the area.